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Abstract 
We use national and regional Canadian data to analyze the relationship between 
economic activity (as reflected by the unemployment rate) and crime rates.  Given 
potential aggregation bias, we disaggregate the crime data and look at the relationship 
between six different types of crimes rates and unemployment rate; we also 
disaggregate the data by region.  We employ an error correction model in our analysis to 
test for short-run and long-run dynamics.  We find no evidence of long-run relationship 
between crime and unemployment, both when we look at disaggregation by type of 
crime and disaggregation by region.  Lack of evidence of a long-run relationship 
indicates we have no evidence of motivation hypothesis.  For selected types of property 
crimes we find some evidence of significant negative short-run relationship between 
crime and unemployment, lending support to the opportunity hypothesis.  Inclusion of 
control variables in the panel analysis does not alter the findings, qualitatively or 
quantitatively. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we use Canadian data to analyze the relationship between 
macroeconomic activity, specifically the unemployment rate, and crime rates.  We start 
our analysis by looking at the national level time series data to gather some insight into 
the relationship between aggregate crime and unemployment; this is followed by a 
disaggregated analysis, where we look at the relationship between six different types of 
crimes rates and unemployment.  Finally, we conduct a panel data analysis to allow for 
disaggregation over different types of crimes and over different regions; where our 
panel consists of ten Canadian provinces.  In our analysis we employ an error correction 
model to test short-run and long-run dynamics that occur in the relationship between 
unemployment and crime as a result of regional variations and the variations in the 
types of crime. 
Since Becker’s (1968) seminal paper, wherein he develops a theoretical model 
of crime behaviour to specifically address the role of deteriorating labour markets, a 
large literature has developed examining the relationship between crime and the 
economy.  Becker argued that an individual will engage in criminal activities as long as 
the expected utility of committing crime is greater than the expected utility of engaging 
in other activities; hence, deteriorations in labor market opportunities make crime 
relatively more attractive.  While Becker’s analysis was at the micro level, we build on 
existing research to explore the link between crime and the state of the macro economy. 
To capture the relationship between crime and the macro economy, researchers 
have made use of a number of different macroeconomic aggregates, such as real GDP 
and unemployment.  Early analysis of the link between crime and the state of the 
economy cycle includes that of Cook and Zarkin (1985) who examine the role of real 
GDP; they find that expansions of economic activity (via a rise in real GDP) has a 
negative impact on property crimes.  Wang and Minor (2002) look at the impact of job 
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accessibility; they conclude that improvements in job accessibility occurring at times of 
economic expansions lower crime rates, however the relationship is stronger for 
property crimes than for crimes of violence.  Alternatively, the unemployment rate is 
used in this literature, as it rises during contractions and falls during expansions and is 
more directly linked with the economic incentives of crime. 
In our paper we use the unemployment rate to capture the link between the 
business cycle and crime rate.  As part of our analysis, we specifically deal with the 
problem of aggregation bias; we start with an aggregated national level analysis, 
followed by disaggregation along the crime margin.  The national level analysis is 
followed by a regional panel analysis, which is also disaggregated along the crime 
margin. 
The issue of aggregation bias has been addressed in this literature before.  An 
early example is the work by Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), who in their paper use 
county level data from North Carolina (US) to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
(which they call ‘jurisdictional heterogeneity’) and find that results based on national 
level data overstate the role of a number of explanatory variables.  Levitt (2001) argues 
that national level data while useful for certain types of analysis are a ‘crude tool’ in 
exploring the link between unemployment and crime rates as the national crime 
statistics potentially remove useful variations.  A similar argument holds for 
disaggregating unemployment rates, as those can differ substantially by regions.  An 
argument can also be made that economic incentives across various kinds of crimes 
vary.  Cherry and List (2002), using the same data, extend the work by Cornwell and 
Trumbull by allowing for different types of crimes, and find evidence of ‘parameter 
heterogeneity’ across crime types. 
The structure of the paper is follows.  Section 2 of the paper reviews the recent 
literature on the link between unemployment and crime.  Section 3 presents a review of 
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the different econometric specification used in the literature to identify the link between 
unemployment and crime using macro level data; we also discuss in detail the 
specification we use in our analysis.  Section 4 presents the empirical analysis: data and 
results.  Discussion and concluding comments are in section 5. 
 
2. Background Literature 
In their seminal work Cantor and Land (1985) developed a theoretical 
framework to explain the link between unemployment and crime.  They suggested two 
important links: opportunity and motivation.  The motivation hypothesis, similar to the 
Becker (1968) analysis, suggested that a decrease in viable economic prospects will 
increase the incentive to engage in crime; so the unemployed are more likely to engage 
in criminal activities; this suggests a positive relationship between crime and 
unemployment.  The opportunity hypothesis (also referred to as the guardianship 
hypothesis) on the other hand suggested that a decrease in economic activity will 
decrease the availability of criminal targets (the unemployed are also more likely to stay 
at home thus decreasing their vulnerability to crime, especially property crime), and 
hence reduce the incentive to engage in crime; this suggests a negative relationship 
between crime and unemployment.  The two effects are expected to work differently 
based on the type of crime; with the motivation hypothesis being more important for 
property crime and opportunity hypothesis being relevant for both property and violent 
crimes (though the effect is still expected to be stronger for the property crimes). 
There are numerous empirical studies investigating the hypothesised theoretical 
relationship between crime and unemployment.  The key finding from much of the 
literature suggests: unemployment matters for property crimes more than for other kinds 
of crime (for example, violent crimes); evidence in support of this relationship is seen 
across countries and time.  However, the evidence on the direction of the relationship 
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(positive or negative) is mixed, it often depends on the econometric specification being 
used and the type of crime being investigated. 
Using US data, Cantor and Land (1985) find evidence for both crime 
opportunity and crime motivation, especially when considering crimes with a property 
component (such as robbery, burglary and larceny).  Findings of Cantor and Land are 
confirmed by Philips and Land (2012), using relatively more recent and larger dataset 
for the US.  Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) and Gould et al. (2002), again using US 
data, report a statistically significant positive relationship between unemployment and 
property crimes, but not one between unemployment and crimes of violence.  Using 
panel data for the 49 US states over the period 1974-2000 Lin (2008) finds elasticity of 
property crime, to changes in unemployment, as high as 4% (1% increase in 
unemployment leads to a 4% increase in crime); further, 33% of the change in property 
crimes over the period of analysis could be attributed to unemployment. 
While a large body of evidence comes from the US, studies using data from 
other countries also find a similar (mostly positive) relationship between crime and 
unemployment.  Reilly and Witt (1996), Witt et al. (1999) and Wu and Wu (2012)1 look 
at the relationship between crime and unemployment for England and Wales; Papas and 
Winkelmann (2000) for New Zealand; Edmark (2005) and Oster and Agell (2007) for 
Sweden; Buonanno (1996) for Italy; and Altindag (2012) does a cross country analysis 
using a country-level panel data from European countries. 
Andresen (2013) used data from Canadian provinces to look at the relationship 
between the state of the economy and crime; where the state of the economy is captured 
by: GDP, unemployment and low income.  The key findings suggest a complex 
relationship between the state of the economy and crime; while the author concludes 
1
 Wu and Wu (2012) find mixed results, with unemployment and fraud having a negative relationship and 
unemployment and drug offences having a positive relationship. 
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that the state of the economy matters for crime, there is no clear finding on the sign and 
magnitude of the estimated parameters. 
Most of empirical analyses looking at economic motives for crime, in general, 
highlight the importance of controlling for other variables which influence crime rate.  
Following Ehrlich (1973), who made the first attempt to empirically operationalise 
Becker’s model of crime and punishment, most commonly used control variables often 
reflect: deterrence mechanism, inequality of income, and demographic factors. 
Corman and Mocan (2005) look at the crime-deterrence-unemployment 
relationship; where deterrence, as measured by size of police force and number of 
arrests for different crimes, is expected to have a negative effect on crime.  Using data 
from the New York City, even after controlling for the deterrence variables, they find a 
significant positive relationship between crime (burglary and motor vehicle theft) and 
unemployment.  Levitt (1996) looks at the impact of incarceration rates on crime across 
all US states.  His findings suggest that an increase in incarceration rates has a negative 
impact on crime; further once the deterrence mechanism is controlled for he too finds a 
positive relationship between unemployment and crime. 
Second set of control variables often reflect the level of inequality, which is used 
to capture the ‘relative economic hardship’ as a motivation for engaging in criminal 
behaviour (Andresen, 2013).  Inequality is expected to impact crime in two ways: first, 
higher the inequality more rich the potential victim, hence higher returns for potential 
offenders; second, lower the relative income of the individuals at the bottom of the 
distribution, less the opportunity costs of engaging in crime for those at the lower end of 
the distribution (Wu and Wu, 2012).  Both Witt et al. (1999) and Machin and Meghir 
(2004), using data from England and Wales, find that relative fall in the wages of the 
low-wage workers increases crime.  Similarly, Entorf and Spengler (2000) use German 
data and find evidence that widening inequality increases the delinquent behaviour. 
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Third set of controls often reflect the demographics.  There are distinct age and 
gender patterns to crime, with young males most likely to commit crime, be arrested 
and incarcerated (Steffensmeier and Allan, 1996; Freeman, 1999).  Evidence from 
Levitt (1996, 1997) suggests that higher % of young population yields higher crime, 
with the 25-44 population having a larger impact.  The impact of youth unemployment 
specifically however yields mixed results.  Oster and Agell (2007), using Swedish data, 
find that while general unemployment significantly impacts crime, there is no evidence 
that youth unemployment impacts crime. 
 
3. Econometric model 
Cantor and Land (1985) not only suggested the two opposing links (opportunity 
and motivation) between crime and unemployment, they also argued that the timing of 
these two links differs; specifically, the opportunity effect has an immediate impact on 
crime, while the motivation effect occurs over time with sustained unemployment.  The 
empirical specification they used to capture the two hypothesised effects is given by the 
following regression equation 
 οܥ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ௧ܷ + ߚଶȟ ௧ܷ + ɂ௧  
where ܥ௧  is log of crime at time ݐ; ௧ܷ  is the unemployment rate at time ݐ; ο  is the 
difference operator, such that ο ௧ܷ ؠ ௧ܷ െ ௧ܷିଵ; and ɂ௧ is the stochastic error term.  ߚ଴, ߚଵ , and ߚଶ  are the parameters to be estimated; where ߚଵ  captures the effect of the 
opportunity hypothesis (the short-run effect), which is expected to be negative (ߚଵ < 0), 
and ߚଶ captures the effect of the motivation hypothesis (the long-run effect), which is 
expected to be positive (ߚଶ > 0).2 
2
 Most of the empirical studies which find a positive link between unemployment and crime (consistent 
with the motivation hypothesis) use annual date and are mainly looking at the relationship between first 
difference of crime and contemporaneous first difference of unemployment i.e. ߚଶ.  Cantor and Land 
argue in their 1985 paper that ‘while the motivational effects of unemployment are lagged, they are of 
relatively short duration’.  Thus, their interpretation of long-run is within a year. 
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While the theoretical economic model specified by Cantor and Land (1985) was 
not subject to criticism, their econometric specification claiming to capture the 
economic model came under heavy criticism early by Hale (1991) and Hale and 
Sabbagh (1991), and later by Greenberg (2001).  The earlier criticism stemmed from the 
developments in co-integration methods, which showed that attempts to explain a 
stationary variable with a non-stationary variable leads to a model that is statistically 
misspecified and results in spurious regression.  Hale (1991) and Hale and Sabbagh 
(1991) argued that while the first difference of crime was stationary, unemployment rate 
in levels was often (if not always) non-stationary.  Consequently, they argue that to 
estimate the relationship one needs to check if the two series to be estimated are 
integrated of the same order, and use co-integration methods if appropriate. 
Subsequently, Greenberg (2001) argued that the use of the difference term 
misspecifies the lag effect i.e. the long-run relationship is not captured, as differencing 
discards information about the long-run trend of the time series; thus arguing that to 
capture the long-run relationship a co-integration model is needed.  Britt (2001) lays out 
the differences between the co-integration approach (argued for by Greenberg) and the 
first difference approach (argued for by Land et al., 1995).  Britt states, that while co-
integration captures the long-run relation, the first difference approach captures a short-
run relationship. 
Andresen (2013) uses panel data from ten Canadian provinces over the period, 
1981-2009, to test the Cantor and Land (1985) model.  The specification they use is 
 ܥ௝௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ൫ ௝ܷ௧ െ ௝ܷ൯ + ߚଶ ௝ܷ + ߚଷܶݎ݁݊݀ + ɂ௧  
where ܥ௝௧  is log of crime in province ݆  at time ݐ .  ௝ܷ௧ െ ௝ܷ  is the deviation of 
unemployment in province ݆ at time ݐ from the average unemployment in province ݆ 
( ௝ܷ) over the period of analysis.  ߚଵ captures the short-run effect and is expected to be 
negative (ߚଵ < 0); and ߚଶ, the coefficient of the average unemployment rate in province 
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݆, captures the long-run effect and is expected to be positive (ߚଶ > 0).  To address the 
issue of non-stationarity in the crime series the authors also include a deterministic trend 
(linear and non-linear) in their analysis; they however ignore the issue of potential non-
stationarity in the unemployment series. 
 
3.1 Our model and estimation strategy 
We consider a somewhat unified approach.  We make use of an error correction 
model that allows us to investigate whether unemployment has both short-run and long-
run dynamics; we address the issue of non-stationarity in both the crime and 
unemployment series; lastly, we do both a time series (national level) analysis and a 
panel (regional) analysis.  Thus, we build on the works of Cantor and Land (1985), Hale 
and Sabbagh (1991), Greenberg (2001), Levitt (2001) and Andresen (2013), and 
incorporate both short term and long term components in estimating a dynamic 
regression model. 
We begin our analysis by looking at the national level time series data.  We 
estimate an error correction model for crime incorporating both the long-run and the 
short-run dynamics, where short term dynamics are viewed as departures from long-run 
equilibrium that may last for short periods.  The first relationship we aim to estimate is 
given by equation (1): 
 οܥ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵ߂ ௧ܷିଵ + ߚଶ ܼ௧ିଵ + ߚଷοܥ௧ିଵ + ߝ௧ (1) 
where ߚଵ < 0 is the coefficient which captures the short-run relationship (opportunity 
hypothesis) between change in crime rates and change in unemployment rates; οܥ௧ିଵ is 
included to capture the dynamics/persistence in crime variables; and ɂ୲ is the stochastic 
error term.  ܼ௧ିଵ = ܥ௧ିଵ െ ߛ ௧ܷିଵ is the error correction term, it captures the long term 
relationship (the motivation hypothesis) between the variables of interest; ߚଶ  (where െ1 < ߚଶ < 0) is the speed of adjustment, which tells us how the variable of interest, 
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here crime, adjusts to deviations from the long-run relationship.  For a long term 
relationship to exist between crime and unemployment we require ߛ ് 0.  If, we find 
that statistically  ߛ = 0 then we conclude that there is no long-run relationship between 
the variables of interest, in which case equation (1) will have no error correction term, 
and all we have is the short-run dynamics. 
We estimate equation (1), first to capture the relationship between total national 
crime rates and national unemployment rates.  Then, we disaggregate total crime into 
six types of crime (including property crimes and violent crimes) and look at the 
relationship, at the national level, between types of crimes and aggregate unemployment 
rate.  In each case we test for the presence of the long term relationship. 
After estimating the national level relationship(s), we disaggregate further 
allowing for regional differences, specifically considering crime rates and 
unemployment rates across the ten Canadian provinces.  At the regional level we 
estimate a panel regression of the form: 
 ȟܥ௝௧ = ߚଵȟ ௝ܷ௧ିଵ + ߚଶ ௝ܼ௧ିଵ + ߚଷοܥ௝௧ିଵ + ߠ௝ + ߝ௝௧ (2) 
where ߠ௝  is the region specific fixed effect; and ߝ௝௧  is the stochastic error term.  The 
estimated coefficients (ߚଵ, ߚଶ and ߚଷ) have the interpretation as in equation (1). 
In our empirical estimation we use log of crime throughout, hence the estimated 
coefficients associated with change in unemployment, in both equations (1) and (2), are 
interpreted as semi-elasticities.  We also test for number of lags, for both crime and 
unemployment, which should be included in equations (1) and (2).  Since we are 
estimating an autoregressive distributed lag model, we also test for model 
misspecification.  For our panel analysis we also include other control variables 
(discussed in section 2 above) in our analysis. 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
All data used in this paper were collected from CANSIM, a data base of 
Statistics Canada.  We have annual data, which at the national and regional level covers 
the period of 1979 to 2006.  Our data includes seven crime series.  At the most 
aggregate level is the series of total crime rate (TC) for Canada and individual 
provinces.  Total crime is then disaggregated into two types of crimes: Crimes of 
Violence (VIO) and Property Crimes (PC).  The property crimes are then further 
disaggregated into four key components of crime: Breaking and Entering (BE), Robbery 
(ROB), Auto Theft (ATH), and Fraud (FR). 
Canada has 13 regions: 10 provinces and 3 territories.  In our panel analysis we 
include all the 10 provinces (see Table 1 for the list of provinces included in the study).  
We do not use the data on the three Canadian territories (Northwest Territories, 
Nanavut, and Yukon) due to the large demographical differences compared to the other 
provinces and due to the lack of data (for example, Northwest Territories was separated 
into Nanavut and the Northwest Territories in 1999, although Nanavut was already 
established in 1993, leading to missing data problems in the mid-1990s). 
The additional control variables included in the panel analysis are: the 
incarceration rate (INCAR); % male, between the ages 18 to 24 years, of total 
population (PMALE18); % male, between the ages 25 to 44 years, of total population 
(PMALE25); and Gini coefficient (GINI) for each province over time.  The 
incarceration rate is included to capture the deterrence mechanism 3; we expect the 
coefficient for INCAR to be negative.  We include GINI to capture the ‘relative 
economic hardship’ as a motivation for engaging in criminal behavior; inequality is 
3
 Incarceration works in two ways: deterrence (threat of sanctions deters people from engaging in crime) 
and incapacitation (while incarcerated criminals are unable to commit crime).  Incarceration rate is 
included with a lag to avoid the problem of reverse causality; see Corman and Mocan (2000, 2005) and 
Levitt (1996). 
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expected to have a positive impact on crime.  We also control for the young (18-24) 
male population as well as the middle age (25-44) male population, to capture the age 
and gender patterns in crime; with the coefficients on these variables expected to be 
positive. 
Figure 1 shows a plot of all the time series, at the national level.  A casual 
inspection reveals that unemployment rose during the recessions in early 1980’s and 
1990’s, with only a modest rise in unemployment during the slowdown in the early 
2000’s. 4  A close look at the total crime rates suggest that we may not obtain strong 
findings of a link between crime and unemployment when looking at aggregate data, 
however when we look at the disaggregated data we do find some interesting patterns.  
The robbery series mimics the unemployment series most closely, it exhibits peaks 
during the recession of the 1980’s and 1990’s with a modest increase in the early 
2000’s.  With respect to fraud, there is a sharp rise prior to the recession in the 1980’s, 
however it continues to stay high into the early 1990s, at which point it falls with a 
slight increase in early 2000’s.  Thus, while it does not exhibit a sharp decline prior to 
the 1990’s recession, it does show similar patterns in the other time periods.  Similarly, 
breaking and entering shows only a modest decline in the mid 1980’s as compared to 
the sharp drop following the 1990’s recession.  Theft falls in the early 1980’s, however 
it rises sharply in the mid 1980’s reaching a peak in the 1990’s recession.  Overall, the 
observation of the data suggests that crime rates in Canada have fallen in recent years. 5 
The descriptive statistics of all variables at the national level are given in Table 
2.  On average, Breaking and Entering is the largest crime committed in Canada.  The 
average unemployment rate over this time period is 8.8%.  Table 3 gives the descriptive 
statistics of the variables at the regional level.  Overall, evidence within each province is 
4
 The recession dates mentioned are those obtained from the work done by the Economic Cycle Research 
Institute (ECRI) and empirical research by Louis and Simons (2005). 
5
 Criminologists have observed a falling trend in crime rates in other countries as well.  Levitt (2004) 
analyzes the causes of decreases in crime rates in US from 1991-2001.  Ward and Carmichael (2001) 
consider the case of England and Wales.  Similar trends are observed for Canada, see Boyce et al. (2014). 
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the same, with breaking and entering being the biggest crime.  Newfoundland and 
Labrador has the highest level of unemployment but the lowest level of total crime.  The 
highest total crime is in British Columbia (province with the highest inequality, as 
measured by Gini) followed by Saskatchewan, both are western provinces.  The 
incarceration rate is the highest is Saskatchewan. 
 
4.2 National level analysis 
A casual observation of the data in Figure 1 suggests that the series might be 
non-stationary.  We conduct an ADF test to check for non-stationarity and report our 
results in Table 4.  We find all the series, with the exception of log of robbery, to be 
non-stationary. 
Before we can estimate equation (1) we need to check whether or not the 
variables are co-integrated.  If we do find co-integration then we will estimate the error 
correction model as specified in (1); if we find no co-integration then we estimate the 
specification without the error correction term.  Table 5 reports the results of the co-
integration test.  We check for co-integration between the total crime rate and the 
unemployment rate, as well as each of the six disaggregated crime series and the 
unemployment rate.  Our results indicate that for Canada there is no long-run 
relationship between unemployment rate and crime at the aggregate level (this is similar 
to the findings of Hale and Sabbagh, 1991, for England and Wales); hence we focus on 
short-run dynamics only. 
The results for the short-run dynamics are reported in Table 6.  With the 
exception of robbery there is a degree of persistence in growth of crime rate (first row, 
Table 6).  Column (1) of Table 6 shows the findings for aggregate total crime at the 
national level.  The results indicate that there is no significant relationship between 
growth in total crime rate and change in unemployment rate.  Once we separate total 
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crime into the two main categories, violent crime and property crime, we still find no 
significant relationship with unemployment (columns 2 and 3, Table 6). 
Next, we disaggregate property crime further into BE, FR, ATH, and ROB.  Our 
findings indicate that fraud and robbery have a significant link with unemployment, and 
the estimated coefficient is negative, lending support to the ‘opportunity hypothesis’.  
For example, consider robbery (column 7, Table 6), the estimated coefficient, ߚመଵ =െ0.03, which indicates that for each one point change in the unemployment rate there is 
a decrease of 0.03 percent in robbery rate. 
Overall, although our analysis does yield some significant results at the national 
level, due to the low number of observations, we extend our sample to a panel, thus 
allowing for another margin of disaggregation; and it allows us to include control 
variables. 
 
4.3 Regional level analysis 
We start our analysis for the regional level data by first checking for unit root in 
all variables.  We use the Fisher-type test which combines the p-values from a unit root 
test (we use the ADF tests) for each cross section (Baltagi, 2013).  The results are 
reported in Table 7.  Most of the series have a unit root, so we use the first difference of 
all series in our analysis.  Next we do a panel co-integration test between each of the 
seven crime series and unemployment, and similar to the national level results we find 
no long-run relationship at the regional level.6  We then go on to analyze the short-run 
dynamics in the panel data. 
In Table 8 we use the same model as used for the national level.  To make sure 
we have no serial correlation in the error term we include two lags of unemployment.  
We find some persistence in growth of crime rate, at the regional level as well, for all 
6
 The panel co-integration test was done using the xtwest command of STATA (Persyn and Westerlund, 
2008).  Results are available from authors on request. 
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the series with the exception of auto theft and fraud (see row 1).7  We find a significant 
negative relationship between change in unemployment and growth in total crime rate.  
When total crime is disaggregated into property crime and violent crime, we see that the 
relationship between total crime and unemployment is driven by the negative 
relationship between property crime and unemployment.  Further disaggregation of 
property crime provides additional insight into the type of crime that is linked with 
unemployment (see columns 4 to 7).  Growth in auto theft and breaking and entering 
have a statistically significant negative relationship with change in unemployment, 
which is consistent with the opportunity hypothesis predictions. 
Next, we estimate the panel model with control variables (presented in Table 9).  
Our findings are robust to the inclusion of control variables i.e. there is no qualitative 
difference in the relationship between crime and unemployment, with or without 
controls (comparing Tables 8 and 9).  We still find a significant relationship between 
unemployment and total crime, and property crimes; in both cases the coefficient is 
negative.  With respect to the crime of violence, results here are in line with those of 
Gould et al. (2002) and Donohue and Levitt (2001), among others, who do not find any 
significant link between violent crime and unemployment.  Disaggregating property 
crime, it’s still growth in breaking and entering and auto theft which show a significant 
negative relationship with change in unemployment. 
For the control variables, we find a significant negative relationship between 
changes in incarceration rates and growth in violent crimes; however, we find no 
evidence of deterrence effects (as captured by incarceration rates) for growth in property 
crimes.  Increase in the proportion of young males (18 to 24 years old) in the population 
increases the incidence of robbery; on the other had an increase in the proportion of 
intermediate age males (25 to 44 years old) in the population is related positively with 
7
 Glaeser et al (1996) and Machin and Meghir (2004) also find significant persistence in crime over time 
across areas. 
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the incidence of violent crimes and other property crimes (breaking and entering and 
fraud).  Change in inequality in the region (as measured by changes in GINI) has no 
significant impact on growth in crime rates. 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
We use national and regional Canadian data to analyze the relationship between 
economic activity (as captured by the unemployment rate) and crime rates.  Our analysis 
takes into account two potential sources of aggregation bias.  First, we disaggregate the 
crime data and look at the relationship between six different types of crimes rates and 
unemployment rate as well as the total aggregates.  Second, we look at regional 
disaggregation; we do analysis both at the national level and for ten provinces of 
Canada. 
We find no evidence of a long-run relationship between crime and 
unemployment, both when we look at disaggregation by type of crime and 
disaggregation by region.  This finding is different from that of Andresen (2013) for 
Canada, who finds a long-run relationship in his panel analysis; the difference in the 
result is likely due to the difference in the methodology used to identify the long run 
relationship.  Lack of evidence for a long-run relationship indicates we have no 
evidence of motivation hypothesis.  This is probably not surprising, as to be able to 
observe a long-run relationship between unemployment and crime in the macro data we 
would expect substantial proportion of population to routinely move in and out of crime 
(Cohen and Felson, 1979) – possibly an unrealistic assumption.  Freeman (1999) further 
speculates that the weak long run relationship between unemployment and crime could 
be due to coexistence of legitimate work and crime; with ‘some criminals shift(ing) 
between crime and work over time, depending on opportunities.’ (Freeman, 1999, p. 
3543). 
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For property crimes we do find some evidence of a significant negative short-
run relationship between crime and unemployment, lending support to the opportunity 
hypothesis.  This finding is in accord with that of Levitt (2001) for the US and Andresen 
(2013) for Canada.  Our findings are robust, qualitatively and quantitatively, to the 
inclusion of control variables for deterrence, inequality and demographics. 
For the type of property crime that has a significant relationship with 
unemployment, results vary by level of disaggregation used: while at the national level 
we find a significant relationship between unemployment and fraud and robbery, at the 
regional level the relationship is significant between unemployment and breaking and 
entering and auto theft.  We peculate here that the results of panel data are more robust; 
we are better able to capture the variations in crime and unemployment (which are lost 
when aggregating the data to national level); and we are able to estimate a more 
complete model with control variables. 
Our analysis also shows that careful attention needs to be paid to the time series 
properties of the data at hand.  This is important for both the long-run relationship 
(when we check for stationarity and co-integration) and for the short-run relationship 
(when we carefully choose the lags of dependents and independent variables to be 
included in the analysis). 
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Table 1: Variable names and codes 
SERIES TITLE CODE 
TOTAL CRIME, ALL INCIDENTS; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LTC 
1. CRIMES OF VIOLENCE; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LVIO 
2. PROPERTY CRIMES; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LPC 
2.1 BREAKING AND ENTERING; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LBE 
2.2 FRAUDS; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LFR 
2.3 THEFT, MOTOR VEHICLES; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LATH 
2.4 ROBBERY; RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION LROB 
All crime variables are in natural logarithms 
 
  UNEMPLOYMENT rate, for age 15 years and over UEM 
INCARCERATION; RATE PER 100,000 ADULTS (in natural logarithms) LINCAR 
% MALE, between ages 18 to 24 years, of total population PMALE18 
% MALE, between ages 25 to 44 years, of total population PMALE25 
Gini Coefficient, after tax income GINI 
  PROVINCE 
 NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR NFL 
PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND PEI 
NOVA SCOTIA NS 
NEW BRUNSWICK NB 
QUEBEC QU 
ONTARIO ON 
MANITOBA MA 
SASKATCHEWAN SK 
ALBERTA AB 
BRITISH COLUMBIA BC 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: National level  
(Time period: 1979-2006) 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
LTC 9.14 0.10 
 
  LVIO 6.78 0.18 
LPC 8.51 0.16 
 
  LBE 7.10 0.21 
LFR 5.94 0.21 
LATH 6.10 0.23 
LROB 4.56 0.09 
 
  UEM 8.79 1.66 
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 Table 3: Descriptive statistics: Regional level 
(Time period: 1979-2006) 
Province 
 
LTC LVIO LPC LBE LFR LATH LROB UEM PMALE18 PMALE25 GINI LINCAR 
AB MEAN 9.29 6.90 8.64 7.08 6.20 6.24 4.45 6.90 6.11 17.12 0.369 4.74 
 
SD 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.14 2.39 1.16 0.83 0.01 0.17 
BC MEAN 9.54 7.12 8.93 7.44 6.05 6.42 4.79 9.28 5.34 16.01 0.374 4.35 
 
SD 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.22 0.32 0.17 2.54 0.75 0.91 0.02 0.10 
MA MEAN 9.38 7.10 8.70 7.29 6.00 6.45 4.86 6.87 5.62 14.99 0.356 4.77 
 
SD 0.10 0.36 0.14 0.18 0.43 0.51 0.28 1.62 0.74 0.88 0.01 0.13 
NB MEAN 8.93 6.63 8.10 6.73 5.75 5.38 3.14 11.93 5.71 15.43 0.351 4.23 
 
SD 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.19 1.71 0.84 0.99 0.01 0.19 
NFL MEAN 8.77 6.70 7.93 6.61 5.59 4.74 2.49 17.13 5.97 15.09 0.343 4.30 
 
SD 0.07 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.36 1.99 0.78 0.97 0.02 0.11 
NS MEAN 9.07 6.76 8.31 6.82 5.95 5.42 3.82 11.10 5.60 15.24 0.356 4.02 
 
SD 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.14 0.25 0.24 0.31 1.85 0.96 1.02 0.01 0.18 
ON MEAN 9.03 6.71 8.39 6.86 5.93 5.85 4.28 7.60 5.55 15.89 0.367 4.46 
 
SD 0.16 0.16 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.16 1.71 0.87 0.81 0.02 0.05 
PEI* MEAN 8.93 6.44 8.09 6.57 5.79 5.14 2.59 13.23 5.53 14.30 0.341 4.49 
 
SD 0.16 0.30 0.12 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.34 2.00 0.74 0.81 0.01 0.16 
QU MEAN 8.91 6.45 8.37 7.22 5.68 6.23 4.91 10.68 5.52 16.21 0.358 4.07 
 
SD 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.27 1.80 1.00 0.97 0.01 0.11 
SK MEAN 9.45 7.05 8.71 7.37 6.32 6.16 4.21 6.38 5.62 14.19 0.367 5.07 
 
SD 0.20 0.41 0.11 0.14 0.24 0.34 0.44 1.25 0.72 0.92 0.01 0.10 
*Prince Edward Island data are not available for 2005. 
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 Table 4: Results of the ADF test: National level 
Variable No trend With trend 
 ADF statistic p-value ADF statistic p-value 
LTC -2.188 0.2108 -2.220 0.4789 
LVIO -2.482 0.119 -1.600 0.7924 
LPC -0.744 0.8349 -2.837 0.1838 
LBE -0.337 0.9201 -2.329 0.4178 
LFR -0.699 0.8469 -2.841 0.1825 
LATH -1.446 0.5598 -1.694 0.7534 
LROB -3.227 0.0185 -3.224 0.0797 
UEM -2.558 0.1020 -3.030 0.1239 
Reported statistics, for all variables, are from the Dickey-Fuller regression with a constant and one lag.  Choice of 
one lag was made based on the diagnostics done on the residuals from the Dickey-Fuller regression, for all 
variables.  All the residuals were found to be white noise (Q-test) and the null hypothesis of ‘no serial correlation’ 
could not be rejected (Breusch-Godfrey LM test for autocorrelation). 
 
Table 5: Results of the co-integration test: National level 
In each case below we are testing for CI between unemployment and the crime variable 
Crime Variable Hypothesis: rank = 0 
Trace Statistics 
(5% critical value = 12.53) 
Hypothesis: rank <=1 
Trace Statistics 
(5% critical value = 3.84) 
LTC 5.781 0.001 
LVIO 8.5299 0.2929 
LPC 6.0436 0.5067 
LBE 8.5297 0.7633 
LFR 6.4065 0.4274 
LATH 6.7766 0.0594 
LROB 4.8784 0.2666 
Reported trace statistics are for Johansen’s test with two lags, in all case.  Different orders of lags were tested, the 
results do not change. 
 
Table 6: National level results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
LTC LVIO LPC LBE LFR LATH LROB 
 
ǻCt ǻCt ǻCt ǻCt ǻCt ǻCt ǻCt 
ǻ&t-1 0.51*** 0.79*** 0.66*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 0.40** 0.43 
 
(0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.28) 
ǻUt-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02 -0.03** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The number of lags included, in each of the seven series, was selected after doing the misspecification test. 
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Table 7: Results of the panel unit root test: Regional level  
Variable No trend With trend 
 Z P Z P 
LTC 0.0025 0.0033 0.6552 0.7174 
LVIO 0.0844 0.1540 0.9961 0.9821 
LPC 0.8367 0.5648 0.0091 0.0012 
LBE 0.8024 0.0143 0.1762 0.0232 
LFR 0.9484 0.9320 0.0348 0.0143 
LATH 0.5191 0.6020 0.6056 0.7658 
LROB 0.2844 0.1059 0.2787 0.3658 
UEM 0.0903 0.1212 0.0143 0.0307 
LINCAR 0.1403 0.0567 0.0934 0.0348 
PMALE18 0.3431 0.2196 0.4002 0.3105 
PMALE25 0.0580 0.1911 0.7423 0.2323 
GINI 0.9950 0.9938 0.5596 0.4362 
Reported p-values, for all variables, are from the Fisher-type ADF test for panel unit root.  The ADF regression 
includes a constant and two lags.  The null hypothesis is ‘all panels contain unit roots’; the alternative hypothesis 
is ‘at least one panel is stationary’.  We report p-values from two different test statistics: Z, which has an inverse 
normal distribution, and P which has the inverse chi-square distribution. 
 
 
TABLE 8: Regional Level Results, no control variables: 1979-2006 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
LTC LVIO LPC LBE LFR LATH LROB 
 
ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t 
ǻCt-1 0.23** 0.27** 0.34*** 0.23** -0.04 0.09 -0.35** 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) 
ǻUt-1 -0.01** -0.00 -0.01*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.03*** 0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
ǻUt-2 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.00*** 0.02*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 0.00*** 0.03*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 270 270 270 270 270 270 270 
R-square within 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The results presented are for the fixed effect model.  Hausman’s test for specification was done, which rejected 
the random-effect model. 
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TABLE 9: Regional Level Results, with control variables: 1979-2006 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
LTC LVIO LPC LBE LFR LATH LROB 
 
ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t ǻ&t 
ǻ&t-1 0.15* 0.16 0.27*** 0.20*** -0.11 0.06 -0.37** 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.16) 
ǻ8t-1 -0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.01** -0.00 -0.02*** 0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ǻ8t-2 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
ǻ30$/(t -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.10 -0.04 0.19* 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
ǻ30$/(t 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.16*** -0.03 0.06 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) 
ǻLINCARt-1 -0.04 -0.05* 0.05 -0.04 -0.12 -0.12 -0.09 
 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.13) (0.07) 
ǻ*,1, -0.34 -0.22 -0.33 -0.09 -0.43 0.49 1.36 
 
(0.40) (0.36) (0.45) (0.84) (0.92) (1.02) (0.81) 
CONSTANT 0.00* 0.02*** -0.00 -0.01** -0.00 0.00 0.04*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
N 269 269 269 269 269 269 269 
R-square within 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.14 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The results presented are for the fixed effect model.  Hausman’s test for specification was done, which rejected 
the random-effect model. 
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 Figure 1: Unemployment rate and Crime at the National Level (1979-2006) 
 
Notes: The solid line gives the crime rate (left hand side axis); the dashed line gives the unemployment rate (right hand side axis). 
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